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Abstract
This paper explores the e¤ects of a government tax policy in a growth model
with economic transition and toxic housing bubbles applied to China. Such a
policy combines taxing entrepreneurs with a one-time redistribution to workers
in the same period. Under the tax policy, we nd that the welfare improvement
for workers is non-monotonic. In particular, there exists an optimal tax at which
social welfare is maximized. Moreover, we consider the welfare e¤ects of setting
the tax at its optimum. We show that the tax policy can be welfare-enhancing,
compare to the case without active policies. The optimal tax may also yield a
higher level of welfare than the case even without housing bubbles. Finally, we
calibrate the model to China. Our quantitative results show that the optimal
tax rate is about 23 percent, and social welfare is signicantly improved with
such a tax policy.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the Chinese housing sector has gone through a spectacular
boom. In Chinas top tier cities, which include Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and
Shenzhen, real housing prices have grown at an annual rate of 13:1 percent from 2003 to
2013 (Fang et al. 2015). Housing prices have soared in tier-2, tier-3, and tier-4 Chinese
cities as well.1 Yet the dramatic housing boom has been accompanied by a smaller
increase in income: data for 35 major Chinese cities show the average real housing
prices grew at 17 percent over the past decade, whereas the average income growth
rate was only 11 percent (Chen andWen 2017). This fact is at odds with the predictions
of standard neoclassical model, which requires that housing prices grow at most as fast
as aggregate income. If housing prices continue to grow, at a higher rate than that of
average income, over time, housing would become increasingly una¤ordable for Chinese
households, especially for those living in top tier cities (Chen et al. 2018). In fact, for
example, as of year 2016, a 90-square-meter apartment in Beijing or Shanghai costs
more than 25 times average household income (Glaeser et al. 2017).
The dramatic size of the Chinese housing boom has left the global economic and
policy communities a question that whether Chinese real estate is a bubble waiting to
burst. Indeed, the fast rise of housing prices is widely viewed as a clear illustration of
the dangers associated with speculative bubbles. Despite the housing boom, vacancy
rates across Chinese major cities are large and persistent, at around one quarter, hence
leading to a phenomenon dubbed as ghost towns. These suggest the presence of
housing bubbles.2 In the literature, most models of rational bubbles adopt the over-
1Chinas cities are typically divided into four categories or tiers, based on the level of economic
development. See Fang et al. (2015) for a clear classication.
2In the small but growing literature studying Chinas housing boom, it is worth noting that some
papers suggest Chinese cities may not experience housing bubbles. For example, Garriga et al. (2017)
emphasize the importance of structural transformation and the resulting rural-urban migration in
accounting for the upward trend in housing price movements in China. Also, Glaeser et al. (2017)
analyze the determinants of demand and supply of housing in China and conclude that a housing
2
lapping generations framework (Samuelson 1958; Tirole 1985; Weil 1987; Grossman and
Yanagawa 1993).3 In terms of welfare implications, the conventional wisdom is that
bubbles are welfare improving because of dynamic ine¢ ciency. However, in terms of
anecdotal evidence, bubbles can be potentially costly and are often accompanied with
crisis and a sharp drop in household wealth when they burst. In fact, policymakers
and researchers are more concerned about the welfare costs of bubbles.4
Specic to Chinas high housing price puzzle, an important paper is by Chen and
Wen (2017), who propose a theory to explain the paradoxical housing boom in China
namely real housing prices outpacing income; high vacancies; and a high rate of return
to capital. Their model framework is an extension of Song et al. (2011) with an
intrinsically valueless housing asset,5 which is shown to be important to study grow-
ing bubbles and to understand Chinas prolonged paradoxical housing boom. Their
simulation results show that the model can quantitatively replicate Chinas housing
price dynamics over the past decade fairly well and still be consistent with many other
salient features of the Chinese economy. Whats more, unlike many traditional bub-
ble models where bubbles are welfare-improving, they show that housing bubbles are
welfare-reducing and toxic. Specically, in the model, the growing bubble crowds out
productive investment, prolongs economic transition, and thus reduces social welfare.
crash is not inevitable.
3It is well known that rational asset bubbles cannot arise in the simple innite-horizon model
because the transversality condition rules out exploding asset prices path (Santos and Woodford 1997).
However, recent studies show that bubble can exist in the innite-horizon economy under certain
conditions, such as introducing trading frictions or borrowing constraints. Notable examples include
Kocherlakota (1992, 2008), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), Farhi
and Tirole (2012), Martin and Ventura (2012), Wang and Wen (2012), Miao and Wang (2014), and
Hirano and Yanagawa (2017).
4In di¤erent model environments, potential costs may include volatility, re sales after the collapse
of bubbles (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2006), and misallocation of resources in the presence of
market distortions (Miao et al. 2015).
5Song et al. (2011) is an inuential paper, which can endogenously generate and quantitatively
account for some important features of Chinas economic transition, such as high output growth,
sustained returns on capital, reallocation within the manufacturing sector, and a large trade sur-
plus. Their growth model is therefor widely adopted in studying Chinas fast growth and economic
transition, see, for example, Song et al. (2014), Chang et al. (2015), and Chen and Wen (2017).
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Since a housing bubble reduces welfare, it is natural to ask what policies can be
used to reduce the negative impact of housing bubbles and possibly improve social wel-
fare? We nd that a tax policy, which combines taxing entrepreneurs with a one-time
redistribution to workers in the same period, may address this issue. The overarching
objective of our study is to explore the welfare e¤ects of a government tax policy in a
growth model with economic transition and toxic housing bubbles applied to China.
One strand of literature discusses the impact of government policies on a¤ecting
bubbles in a classical Samuelson-Tirole bubble model (see Galí 2014 and Miao et al.
2015). For example, in an OLG model with nominal rigidities, Galí (2014) examines
the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on a rational asset price bubble. He
nds that a systematic increase in interest rates in response to a growing bubble is
shown to enhance the uctuations in the latter, through its positive e¤ect on bubble
growth. This calls into question the theoretical foundations of the case for leaning
against the windmonetary policies. There is another strand of literature on Chinas
housing price puzzle. However, most the theoretical works along this line focus on why
the housing price level is so high (see Zhao 2015 and Garriga et al. 2017), instead of
asking why housing prices have been able to grow faster than income.6 Our analysis
forms a bridge between the two strands of studies. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the rst to design and study the impact of government policies on reducing
Chinas housing bubbles and improving welfare.
Specically, we rst show that the workers lifetime utility is non-monotonically
increasing with the tax policy. In particular, there exists a closed-form optimal tax
rate, at which workers welfare is maximized. This non-monotonic relationship between
welfare and the tax rate is due to a trade-o¤ e¤ect of the tax policy. On the one hand,
6At the same time, it is worth noting that there is a growing empirical literature on housing prices
in China. For instance, see Wang (2011), Wu et al. (2012), Wang and Zhang (2014), Wu et al. (2014),
Huang et al. (2015), Wu et al. (2015), and Wu et al. (2016), among others.
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a positive tax rate increases workerswelfare as they receive real resources transferred
to consumption every period. However, such a tax policy also implies a fall in capital
accumulation, resulting in a decrease of productive resources. Second, we dene social
welfare as the sum of entrepreneurs and workers lifetime utilities. Our results show
that there exists an optimal tax rate, at which social welfare is maximized.
While it is immediately obvious that such a tax regime would reduce entrepreneurs
welfare but improving workers welfare, if the losses of entrepreneurs are dominated
by the gains of workers, an active tax policy can improve social welfare by making
the housing bubble less toxic to workers. We show analytically that under certain
conditions, the tax policy can be welfare-enhancing, compare to the case without active
policies. The optimal tax policy may also yield a higher level of welfare than the case
even without housing bubbles. Finally, we calibrate the model to Chinese economy.
Our quantitative results show that, under a large range of parameter values, the optimal
tax rate changes from 21 percent to 23 percent. In addition and more importantly,
the welfare gains by workers are quantitatively large whereas the welfare losses by
entrepreneurs are relatively small. There are therefore always welfare gains when the
tax policy is active.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple two-period growth
model and characterizes the equilibrium, as well as the models qualitative implications.
Section 3 investigates the welfare implications of an explicit government tax policy, both
on workers and entrepreneurs. Section 4 calibrates the model to China, and discusses
quantitative implications of the tax policy. Section 5 concludes with remarks for further
research. The Appendix contains proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions.
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2 The benchmark model
This section describes our model economy and discusses its key assumptions. Our pur-
pose is to study the Chinese housing market and the e¤ects of an active tax policy on
social welfare. Such a policy combines taxing entrepreneurs with a one-time redistri-
bution in the same period. The redistribution is implemented by a lump-sum tax on
entrepreneurs who are the marginal investors in the housing market and a lump-sum
transfer to workers who are adversely a¤ected by the housing bubbles.
Our analyses are based on the model of Chen and Wen (2017), which is consistent
with the institutional background and stylized empirical facts about China and its
housing market behavior. In particular, the model framework is an extension of Song
et al. (2011) with an intrinsically valueless housing asset. For simplicity, the model
excludes low-income households (workers) from the housing market because their par-
ticipation has only a level e¤ect but no growth e¤ects on the housing prices. The
housing bubbles are growing and more importantly, toxic, in that a housing bubble re-
duces aggregate consumption and the welfare of both entrepreneurs and workers. This
market failure warrants policy interventions.
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations (OLG) of two-period
lived agents who work in the rst period and live o¤ savings in the second period.
Agents have heterogeneous skills. In each cohort, half of the population consists of
workers without entrepreneurial skills and the other half consists of entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurial skills are inherited from parents; for simplication and without loss of
generality, we do not allow transition between social classes. The total population, Nt,
grows at an exogenous rate v; hence, Nt+1 = (1 + v)Nt:
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2.1 Technology
There are two production sectors and thus two types of rms, both requiring capital
and labor. Labor is perfectly mobile across the two sectors but capital is not. The rst
sector consists of nancially integrated neoclassical rms, F-rms, which, for simplicity,
are owned by a representative nancial intermediary (e.g., a state-owned bank).
The second sector is a newly emerging private sector composed of unconventional
entrepreneurial rms, E-rms, operated by entrepreneurs. More specically, E-rms
are owned by old (parent) entrepreneurs, who are residual claimants on prots, and
they hire their own children as managers. Workers can choose to work for either type
of rm.
The key assumptions are that E-rms are more productive than F-rms but, due to
asymmetric nancial imperfections, E-rms are borrowing constrained they cannot
borrow from each other or from any other sources. As a result, E-rms must self-nance
capital investment through their own savings. In contrast, F-rms can rent capital from
their representative nancial intermediary at a xed interest rate. Accordingly, F-rms
can survive in the short run despite inferior technology. Over time, however, labor will
gradually reallocate from F-rms to E-rms as the capital stock of E-rms expands.
Thus, the economy features a transition stage during which F-rms and E-rms coexist,
but the F-sector is shrinking and the E-sector is expanding. When the transition ends,
only E-rms exist and the economy becomes a representative-agent growth model with
neoclassical features.7 Matching the model specication to China, it is obvious that
F-rms can be interpreted as state-owned enterprises, while E-rms are private rms.
The technology of F-and E-rms are described, respectively, by the following pro-
7Note that, following Song et al. (2011) and Chen and Wen (2017), the term "transition" is
di¤erent from the convention in the neoclassical growth model, where transition means the dynamic
path from an initial state towards the steady state. In our paper, this conventional transition phase
shows up after the F-sector disappears. To avoid confusion, we call this neoclassical transition period
"post-transition" stage.
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duction functions:
yFt = (k
F
t )
(Atn
F
t )
1 ; yEt = (k
E
t )
(Atn
E
t )
1 
where y; k;and n denote per capita output, capital stock, and labor, respectively. The
parameter  > 1 captures the assumption that E-rms are more productive than
F-rms. Technological growth in both sectors is constant and exogenous, given by
At+1 = (1 + z)At:
2.2 Workers problem
We now analyze agentssavings problem. Young workers earn a wage w and deposit
their savings with the representative bank, receiving a gross interest rateR. In addition,
with an active tax policy, the tax revenue T is transferred in a lump-sum manner to
the current young for consumption. Without loss of generality, we also assume that
workers do not speculate in the housing market, since allowing workers to invest in
housing market does not change our main results.8
The workers consumption-saving problem is:
max log cw1t +  log c
w
2t+1
subject to cw1t + s
w
t = wt + Tt and c
w
2t+1 = s
w
t R; where wt is the market wage rate;
cw1t; c
w
2t+1; and s
w
t denote consumption when young, consumption when old, and the
workers savings, respectively. This yields the optimal savings swt = 
w(wt +Tt); where
w  (1 +  1) 1:
8Indeed, in the quantitative analysis section later, we also consider the case where workers are
allowed to speculate in the housing markets. We nd that the growth rate of housing prices is
una¤ected. This is because of the equilibrium growth rate of housing prices in the model is determined
by the rate of return to capital of the entrepreneurs, who act as the marginal investors in the bubbly
equilibrium.
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2.3 The F-rms problem
In each period, an F-rm maximizes prots by solving the following problem:
max
kFt ;n
F
t
(kFt )
(Atn
F
t )
1    wtnFt  RkFt
Prot maximization implies that R equals the marginal product of capital and that
wages equal the marginal product of labor:
wt = (1  )(
R
)

1 At (1)
Note that during the transition, wages per e¤ective unit of labor, wt=At; are constant
due to a constant rental rate for capital and, accordingly, a constant capital-to-labor
ratio, (kFt =Atn
F
t ) = (=R)
1
1  :
2.4 The E-rms problem
Following Song et al. (2011), we assume that E-rms must hire a manager (i.e. the
young entrepreneur) and pay him a xed  < 1 fraction of the output produced as
a compensation mt; in order to satisfy an incentive-compatibility constraint.9 The
incentive constraint is important, because in its absence managers would be paid the
workerswage, and the equilibrium would feature no capital accumulation in E-rms
and no transition from F-rms to E-rms. In addition, under an active tax policy, the
E-rm, owned by an old entrepreneur, must pay a tax  . Such a tax can be interpreted
as various government policies that restrict the growth of private rms (e.g., entry
9The managerial compensation must also exceed the workerswage rate, i.e. mt > wt: We restrict
attention to parameters and initial conditions such that the participation constraint is never binding
in equilibrium.
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barriers for private rms into strategicindustries and a higher tax burden).10 Since,
in reality, tax policies a¤ect the overall protability of private rms, we assume that
such a policy also applies to young entrepreneursmanagerial compensation. Accord-
ingly, the lump-sum transfer to workers Tt is given by Tt = (kEt )
(Atn
E
t )
1 : The
old entrepreneurs problem can be written as:
max
mt;nEt
(1  )(kEt )(AtnEt )1   mt   wtnEt ; (2)
subject to the incentive constraint that mt  (1  ) (kEt )(AtnEt )1 , and arbitrage
in the labor market implies that the wage is as in (1). The optimal contract implies
that the incentive constraint is binding:
mt = (1  ) (kEt )(AtnEt )1  (3)
Taking the rst-order condition with respect to nEt and substituting in the equilib-
rium wage yield optimal level of employment as:
nEt = [(1  )(1   )]
1
 (
R

)
1
1 
kEt
At
(4)
Plugging Equations (4) and (3) into Equation (2) yields the value of the rm:
(kEt ) = [(1  )(1   )]
1

1 
 RkEt  Et kEt
10As noted by Chen and Wen (2017), the Chinese government increases the tax rate of private rms
over time. For example, in 2007, the state government issued a document (the 39th Decree), which
requests a transition from preferential corporate income tax rates to legal tax rates. Accordingly, those
who enjoyed a 15 percent corporate income tax rate before 2008 would face gradually progressive tax
rates of 18 percent, 20 percent, 22 percent, 24 percent, and 25 percent for each year between 2008 and
2012, respectively. In this OLG framework, we interpret it as a one-o¤ lump-sum tax accompanied
by a one-time redistribution.
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where E is the E-rm rate of return to capital. Following Song et al. (2011), we
impose the following assumption about E-rms relative productivity, such that an
entrepreneurs return to capital is higher than the deposit rate, R, during the transition.
Assumption 1:  > (1   )  11 
Given this assumption, young entrepreneurs would nd it optimal to invest in the
family business. If Assumption 1 were not satised, there would be no E-rms in
equilibrium. Thus, a su¢ ciently large productivity di¤erence is necessary to trigger
economic transition.
2.5 The young entrepreneurs problem
As in Chen and Wen (2017), the young entrepreneur decides on consumption and port-
folio allocations in housing investment, bank deposits, or physical capital investment.
The rate of return to capital investment is simply Et . We assume that the balanced
growth rate, which equals the rate of return to housing investment at the steady state,
is greater than the bank deposit rate that is, (1 + z)(1 + v) > R. As a result, the
entrepreneur will always prefer investing in housing to depositing funds in the bank.
Given housing prices, PHt , the young entrepreneur faces a two-stage problem.
In the rst stage, a young entrepreneurs consumption-saving problem is:
max
sEt
log(mt   sEt ) +  logREt+1sEt
where REt+1  maxfE; PHt+1=PHt g is the rate of return for the entrepreneurs savings
and depends on the entrepreneurs portfolio choices. First-order conditions give the
optimal savings of the young entrepreneur as sEt =
mt
(1+ 1) .
In the second stage, the young entrepreneur chooses portfolio allocations, given
total savings, sEt . The fraction 
E
t of savings is invested in capital, such that K
E
t+1 =
11
Et s
E
t N
E
t ; where K
E
t+1 = k
E
t+1N
E
t+1 is total E-rm capital. The remaining (1   Et )
fraction of savings is invested in housing, such that PHt H
E
t = (1 Et )sEt NEt ; where HEt
is the total housing stock purchased by young entrepreneurs in period t. In addition,
we ensure that there exists an interior solution for the portfolio choice, such that the
following no-arbitrage condition holds:
PHt+1
PHt
= Et+1;
where Et+1 = 
E is constant during the transition. Therefore, an old entrepreneurs
income is simply EsEt . The above condition states that the entrepreneurs rate of
return to housing and rate of return to capital must be equal in a bubbly equilibrium.
That is, the young entrepreneur is indi¤erent between investing in the capital stock
or in the housing asset. In addition, we assume that for each period the bank simply
absorbs deposits from young workers, lends out to F-rms at interest rate R, and then
invests the rest in foreign bonds with the same rate of return R, as in Song et al.
(2011).
2.6 Law of motion
We now characterize the equilibrium dynamics during a transition in which there is
positive employment in both E- and F-rms. There are two state variables in this
model: KEt and At: Since the E-rm is self-nanced, the law of motion for E-rm
capital stock follows:
KEt+1 = 
E
t
Et  
(1   )
1
1 +  1
KEt ; (5)
where Et = [(1   )(1    )]
1

1 
 R for all periods during the transition stage. The
entrepreneurs portfolio share in physical capital, Et , is assumed to be constant, which
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together with a constant E, implies that the growth rate of E-rm capital is constant
during the transition. Similarly, the law of motion for housing demand is:
PHt
H = (1  Et )
Et  
(1   )
1
1 +  1
KEt ; (6)
where we have used the housing market-clearing condition, HEt = H. Here, we assume
that the housing supply is xed, which reects the fact that land available for home
construction in China is strictly controlled by the government.
2.7 Post-transition equilibrium and the steady state
Once the transition is completed, F-rms disappear and all workers are employed by
E-rms. Thereafter, the theory predicts standard OLG-model dynamics. Since nEt = 1;
E-rm prot is:
(kEt ) = (1  )(1   )(kEt )(At)1 ; (7)
and the rate of return to E-rm capital is simply Et = (1 )(1  )(kEt ) 1(At)1 :
The steady state of the economy is reached only in the post-transition stage. Since
all per capita variables (except labor inputs and housing) grow at the rate At, we
detrend them as x^t = xt=At: At the steady state, the law of motion for capital (5)
implies:
k^E = [
 E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1  : (8)
Given that E = (1  )(1   )(k^E=) 1; we have
E = 
(1   )
 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
E
(9)
The equilibrium portfolio allocation E is solved by the no-arbitrage condition.
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Since the supply of housing is xed, the growth rate of housing prices, denoted as
Et+1 = P
H
t+1=P
H
t , equals the balanced growth rate, (1 + z)(1 + ), in the steady state.
As a result, the no-arbitrage condition implies that the E-rm steady-state portfolio
share in physical capital is:
E = (1   )(1 +  1)= 
In addition, we follow Chen and Wen (2017) and impose the parameter restrictions
to ensure the existence of housing bubbles.
Assumption 2:  > (1 +  1)=[1 + (1 +  1)]
This assumption implies that E < 1; that is, a housing bubble exists in the
equilibrium.
Assumption 3:  < (1 +  1)[ + (1   )]
As shown by Chen and Wen (2017), if Assumption 2 and 3 are both satised, a
housing bubble is toxic (welfare-reducing) in that it reduces aggregate consumption
and the welfare of both entrepreneurs and workers. For entrepreneurs, in addition
to foregone returns to capital, entrepreneurial housing investment reduces the lifetime
income of future entrepreneurs and, thus, negatively impacts their consumption. For
workers, in the post-transition stage, workerslifetime utility decreases as a result of
the housing bubble. This is because workerswage income starts to depend positively
on E-rm capital stock, while the rate of return to savings is still xed.
3 Welfare analysis
In this section, we study the welfare implications of an explicit government tax policy.
Specically, we rst analyze the asymmetric e¤ects of the tax policy on both entrepre-
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neurs and workers. We then examine for the existence of an optimal tax rate at which
welfare is maximized. In addition and more importantly, we compare social welfare
with and without an active tax policy and explore the necessary conditions for which
welfare is improved. Let us start with entrepreneurs welfare and workers welfare at
di¤erent transition stages.
Lemma 1 summarizes the solutions to entrepreneurs welfare at the transition stage,
the post-transition stage, and the steady state equilibrium. As discussed later, the
welfare functions are also used to derive the optimal tax rate and explore the conditions
under which an optimal policy is welfare-enhancing. All the proofs of lemmas and
propositions are included in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Given ; ; ;  ;  ; and kEt ; At; the entrepreneurs lifetime utility func-
tion can be expressed as:
1. For entrepreneurs born during the transition, the lifetime utility is:
log(mt   sEt ) +  log EsEt
= (1 + ) log (1  ) 1 [(1   )] 1  (R

)kEt +  log[(1  )(1   )]
1

1 
 R
  log(1 + )   log(1 +  1)
2. For entrepreneurs born in the post-transition stage, but before reaching the steady
state, the lifetime utility is:
log(mt   sEt ) +  log Et+1sEt
= ( + 2) log kEt   (1  ) log Et + (1  )(1 +  + ) logAt
+ log
 (1  )
(1 + )
+  log
(1  )1+(1   ) (1 + z)1 
(1 +  1)(1 + ) 1
3. For entrepreneurs born after reaching the steady state, the lifetime utility is
(after being detrended):
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log(m^   s^E) +  log Es^E
= (1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 (1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+[
(1 + )
1     ] log 
E + log(
 
(1 + )(1   )) +  log(1 + )
Note that the rate of return to capital is constant during the transition period,
whereas it starts to depend negatively on capital stock when the economy enters the
post-transition period. In particular, E is decreasing during the post-transition stage
as capital accumulates; it is falling until the economy enters the steady state equilib-
rium.
Lemma 2 summarizes the solutions to workers welfare at the transition stage, the
post-transition stage, and the steady state equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Given ; ; ;  ;  ; and kEt ; At; the workers lifetime utility function can
be expressed as:
1. For workers born during the transition, the lifetime utility is:
log(wt   swt + Tt) +  logRswt
= (1 + ) log[(1  )At(
R
)

1  +  [(1  )(1   )] 1  (R

)kEt ]
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
2. For workers born in the post-transition stage, but before reaching the steady state,
the lifetime utility is:
log(wt   swt + Tt) +  logRswt
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]At(kEt )(At) 
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
3. For workers born after reaching the steady state, the lifetime utility is (after
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being detrended):
log(w^   s^w + T^ ) +  logRs^w
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][  
E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
Note that the wage rate is constant during the transition when both E-rms and
F-rms coexist. Unlike the rate of return to capital, the wage rate starts to depend
positively on capital stock in the post-transition period. That is, it increases as E-rms
capital accumulates. Next, it is interesting to explore how such a tax policy a¤ects the
growth rate of housing prices at the di¤erent stages of the economy.
Lemma 3 During both the transition and post-transition stages, the tax policy
reduces housing bubbles.
In this model, the housing bubble arises because high capital returns driven by
resource reallocation are not sustainable in the long run. Rational expectations of a
strong future demand for alternative stores of value can thus induce currently pro-
ductive agents to speculate in the housing market. During both the transition and
post-transition stages, the growth rate of housing prices equals the rate of return of
capital by no-arbitrage condition, i.e.
PHt+1
Pt
= Et+1: Specically, during the transition
stage, E is constant, E = [(1 )(1  )] 1 1  R; during the post-transition stage, Et
is a function of two state variables, kEt and At; 
E
t = (1  )(1   )(kEt ) 1(At)1 :
In either case, the housing growth rate is decreasing with a positive tax rate  :We now
explore the welfare implications of such a tax policy.
Proposition 1 Given two state variables kEt and At; during the transition and post-
transition stages, entrepreneurs welfare is monotonically decreasing with the tax policy;
however, workers welfare is non-monotonically increasing with the tax policy. Specif-
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ically, in the transition stage, the welfare-maximizing optimal tax rate   = ; in the
post-transition stage, the welfare-maximizing optimal tax rate   = (1 ) (1 
T+1)(1 )(1  )
(1 T+1) (1 T+1)(1 )(1  ) ;
where T  1 denotes the number of time periods since the economy enters the post-
transition stage.
From Lemma 1, the entrepreneurs welfare is monotonically decreasing with a pos-
itive tax rate as the government directly tax both young and old entrepreneurs. For
workers, although the welfare improvement with an active policy is positive, there ex-
ists a non-monotonic relationship between welfare and the tax rate. This is due to a
trade-o¤ e¤ect of the tax policy. On the one hand, a positive tax rate increases work-
erswelfare as they receive real resources transferred for consumption every period. On
the other hand, however, such a tax policy also implies a fall in capital accumulation,
thus a decrease of productive resources. In the post-transition stage and steady state
equilibrium, workers wage rate is no longer constant and depends positively on the
capital stock whereas their saving benet is still xed. Over time, the higher the tax
rate, the lower real resources they can receive. Such a conicting e¤ect suggests that
there may exist an optimal tax policy. The tractability of the model allows us to nd
a closed-form optimal tax rate at which workers welfare is maximized.
Proposition 2 In the bubbly steady state, the workers lifetime utility is non-
monotonically increasing with the tax policy. In particular, there exists an optimal
tax rate   = (1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) ; at which workers welfare is maximized. If we dene
social welfare as the sum of entrepreneurs and workers lifetime utilities, then there
exists an optimal tax rate   =
1
2
(1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) , at which welfare is maximized.
Let us focus on the welfare e¤ects of an active tax policy in the bubbly steady
state. Proposition 2 states that there exists an optimal tax rate for workers, because of
the trade-o¤ e¤ect that we highlight above. In addition and more importantly, there
also exists an optimum at which social welfare (the sum of entrepreneurs and workers
18
lifetime utilities) is maximized. This is still mainly because of the conicting e¤ect of
tax policy on workers welfare. However, the welfare losses of entrepreneurs have to
be taken into consideration when it comes to the optimal tax rate for social welfare.
Thus, one would expect a lower optimal tax, as discussed in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 The size of the optimal tax rate for social welfare is smaller than that
for workers welfare:   <  :
If we compare the two optimal tax rates, we nd that the size of the optimal tax
for social welfare is smaller than that for workers welfare. This is because taking into
account of the welfare losses of entrepreneurs makes one to compensate for them, thus
requiring a lower value for the tax rate. This, however, does not a¤ect the existence of
an optimal tax rate.
Denition 1 Social welfare is dened as the sum of entrepreneurs and workers life-
time utilities, which givesW = uw+uE = (log cw1t+ log c
w
2t+1)+(log c
E
1t+ log c
E
2t+1):
11
Assumption 4  > 2(1   ):
From Proposition 2, the optimal tax rate of social welfare is given by   =
1
2
(1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) : As the tax rate is positive, we have  > 2(1  ): Next, it would be
interesting to explore whether and under what conditions that the optimal tax policy
is welfare enhancing.
Proposition 3 In the bubbly steady state, setting the tax rate at the optimal level
  =
1
2
(1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) strictly improves workers welfare by (1+) log(
  1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))

1 
1
2

(1  ) ,
whereas such a tax policy strictly reduces entrepreneurs welfare by (1+) log(  
1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1
1  :12
With agents having perfect foresight, if they anticipate that in each period the gov-
ernment implements the tax policy of combining an entrepreneurial tax and a lump-sum
transfer to workers, they can evaluate the welfare e¤ect of such a policy. Proposition
11Note that we follow the assumption that workers and entrepreneurs are equally populated in the
economy, as in Chen and Wen (2017).
12Here we focus on the equilibrium with and without the optimal tax policy.
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3 essentially states that, if the tax policy is implemented at its optimum, the workers
welfare is strictly improved by (1 + ) log(  
1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))

1 
1
2

(1  ) , whereas the entrepre-
neurs welfare is strictly reduced by (1 + ) log(  
1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1
1  . As such, if workers
anticipate the e¤ects of the tax policy, they would always prefer the tax rate to be set
at the optimum.
Proposition 4 Compare to the equilibrium without the tax policy, setting the tax
rate at the optimum   =
1
2
(1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) improves social welfare, if (
  1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1+
1 
1
2

(1  ) >
1. Compare to the equilibrium even without housing bubbles, setting the tax rate at the
optimal level improves social welfare, if (  
1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1+
1 
1
2

(1  )(
E)
2
1   1+ > 1.
Proposition 4 states the condition under which an optimal tax policy is welfare-
enhancing, compare to the equilibriumwithout an active policy. The economic intuition
is as follows. As mentioned above, housing bubbles are toxic (i.e. welfare-reducing) in
this model as they reduce aggregate consumption and the welfare of both entrepreneurs
and workers. For entrepreneurs, the tax policy is strictly welfare reducing. For workers,
however, such a tax policy could compensate to some extent the welfare losses from a
declining wage rate. In other words, an active tax policy makes the housing bubble less
toxic to workers. If the benets of workers dominate the costs of entrepreneurs, such
a tax policy would improve social welfare. In addition, if the benets from workers
are large enough, it is possible that the optimal tax policy yields a higher level of
social welfare than the case even without housing bubbles. In the next section, we
quantify the welfare gains (or lack thereof) with an active tax policy, based on realistic
parameterization of the Chinese economy.
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4 Quantitative analysis
We have focused so far on qualitative predictions of the tax policy. A numerical analysis
based on realistic parameters is also interesting, both to quantify the welfare gains (or
lack thereof) associated with the tax policy and to give a sense of how the model
predictions are sensitive to changes in the di¤erent parameters.
4.1 Parameters
Our parameterization largely follows those of Song et al. (2014), who calibrate a
similar two-period OLG model for China. Each period in our model corresponds to
30 calendar years. In terms of technology parameters, the capital income share is set
 = 0:5, consistent with Bai et al. (2006). We assume an annualized world interest rate
of 1:75 percent, following Song et al. (2011), that is, R = (1:0175)30. The land supply
is normalized to unity, H = 1. On the demand side,  is calibrated to (0:98)30 so as
to generate a 35:3 percent household savings rate (in the absence of activist policies),
which meets the average urban household savings rate in 19982012 (Chen and Wen
2017). In addition,  and  are calibrated to match two empirical moments: (i) the
capital-output ratio of Chinese F-rms is around three times larger than that of E-rms
(average 19982005) (Song et al. 2011); (ii) the rate of return to capital is around 18
percent (Chen and Wen 2017). This yields  = 0:625 and  = 8:24. Finally, as in
Chen and Wen (2017), the rate of labor-augmented technological growth is set to 3:8
percent, that is, z = (1:038)30  1, to meet the average 10 percent growth rate of GDP
during 19982012. The population growth rate is set to three percent, consistent with
the average urban population growth rate in China during the same period, implying
that  = (1:03)30   1.
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4.2 Results
We now report the quantitative result of the optimal tax rate, and more importantly,
quantify whether setting the tax rate at its optimum improves social welfare. Following
Proposition 2, we can calculate the optimal tax rate   = 23:25%, at which social
welfare is maximized. That is, the optimal tax policy requires the setting of a 23%
tax on entrepreneurs with a one-time redistribution to workers. This policy would of
course reduce entrepreneurs welfare while strictly improve workers welfare, according
to Proposition 3. What is of most interest to us is whether such a tax policy improves
total welfare, and if so, by how much we can gain compare to the case without active
policies.
Proposition 4 suggests that if (  
1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1+
1 
1
2

(1  ) > 1, setting an optimal tax is
welfare-improving. Given our calibration, our calculation indicates that, (  
1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1+
1 
1
2

(1  ) =
4:9664, and social welfare is improved by 1:0757 (or in relative term, 19:6%).13 Specif-
ically, in accordance to Proposition 3, having normalized the initial welfare value
to be the same for the two groups, we nd a large increase in the level of wel-
fare for workers (by 1:431, or in relative term, 36:6%), whereas the drop in entre-
preneurs welfare is relatively moderate (by 0:3553, or in relative term, 22:3%). In
addition, we try to evaluate the welfare gains (or losses) with the optimal tax rate,
compared to the case even without housing bubbles. Based on Proposition 4, if
(
  1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1+
1 
1
2

(1  )(
E)
2
1   1+ > 1, the optimal tax policy would be welfare-
enhancing. We show that, (  
1
2
(1 )
 (1 )(1  ))
1+
1 
1
2

(1  )(
E)
2
1   1+ = 3:80 in this case,
and social welfare is improved by 0:896 (or in relative term, 16:8%). In sum, our sim-
ple numerical experiments indicate that, using realistic parameter values specic to
Chinese economy, a government tax policy can yield a higher level of social welfare,
13The relative welfare improvement might seem large as we are only doing the steady state analysis
of a two-period OLG model.
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compared to the case without active policies or even without housing bubbles. The
relative gains are from workers (albeit small losses for entrepreneurs) for whom such
an active tax policy would compensate the welfare losses from toxic housing bubbles
and a declining wage income.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
This section performs sensitivity analysis with regard to some key parameters. As
shown in the previous section, most parameter values are standard in the literature or
consistent with Chinese data. We are interested in evaluating two parameters,  and ,
as they are not explored in the literature despite having important policy implications
on social welfare.  reects the managerial cost involved in managing private rms,
while  measures the productivity di¤erence between E-rms and F-rms. Note that
in our model,  and  are simultaneously solved for the capital-output ratio of the two
types of rms and the rate of return of capital E. That is, (i) denote F ; E as capital
to output ratio for F-rms and E-rms, given , F=E = [(1  )] 1  ; (ii) given  and
R, E = (1  ) 1 1  R. In general, F-rms (as state-owned enterprises) have a higher
capital-to-output ratio, which means F=E > 1, and E is also greater than one. In
this section, we rst set  at its benchmark value and perform sensitivity analysis with
respect to  . Then, we set  at its benchmark value and perform sensitivity analysis
with respect to . Results are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
In Table 1, we vary the value of  from 0:15 to 0:65,14 while keeping  constant at
its benchmark, and we report also the optimal tax rate and welfare gains, compare to
the case without such a tax policy. Our results show that as  increases, the optimal
tax rate decreases and so do the welfare gains.15 The optimal tax rate however does
14A value higher than 0:65 would yield a capital return rate E that is smaller than 1, which means
the economy is not having a bubble. These scenarios are therefore not examined.
15It is immediately clear that both F =E and E are negatively related to  and positively related
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not change much, ranging from about 21% to 23%. More importantly, we nd that
there are always welfare gains with an active tax policy. In other words, the lower the
managerial cost involved, the more room the economy gains in terms of social welfare.
Similar results hold when we vary the value of  from 7 to 12,16 as shown in Table
2. Both the optimal tax rate and welfare are increased with a higher , and the welfare
gains are always positive in the range. In essence, these mean the larger the initial
productivity di¤erence between the two types of rms, the higher the optimal tax rate
is, though this has no e¤ect on the welfare-enhancing property of the one-o¤ tax policy.
The above experiments imply that, under the tax policy, the benets for workers are
generally large enough to compensate the losses of entrepreneurs, which in turn yields
a higher level of social welfare.
Indeed, we also explore a case where workers are allowed to speculate in the housing
market. This involves assuming the workers to put a xed fraction of their savings, %, in
the housing market and receive the same housing returns as those of the entrepreneurs,
Et . In this instance, in the second period, on top of the interest return, R, workers
receive also the housing returns, and therefore have second-period consumption as
cw2t+1 = s
w
t [(1  %)R + %Et ].17 While it turns out that this specic case does not allow
for the analytical derivation of a closed-form optimal tax rate as in Proposition 1, we
veried that Propositions 2-4 remain largely true, in that, setting the tax rate at the
optimal level   strictly improves social welfare in the bubbly steady state, despite
the negative e¤ect on housing speculations.18
to .
16A value smaller than 7 would yield a capital return rate E small than 1.
17In fact, given that Et > R, workers will always invest in housing up to % share of their savings.
18Derivations of this experiment are available upon request.
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5 Concluding remarks
Housing prices have soared in Chinese cities over the last decades, which raises growing
concerns across the world regarding the housing bubbles. Based on a growth model
with economic transition and toxic housing bubbles applied to China, this paper designs
and studies the welfare implications of an active government tax policy designed to
curb housing bubbles. Such a policy combines taxing entrepreneurs with a one-time
redistribution to workers in the same period. The aim of the study is to explore whether
and how this tax policy can reduce the negative e¤ects of a bubble and improve social
welfare.
Under the tax policy, we nd that the welfare improvement for workers is non-
monotonic. In particular, there exists an optimal tax rate at which workers welfare is
maximized. Dening social welfare as the sum of entrepreneurs and workers lifetime
utilities, we also nd a closed-form tax at which social welfare is maximized. Moreover,
we consider the welfare e¤ects of setting the tax at its optimum. We show that the tax
policy can be welfare-enhancing, compared to the case without active policies. The
optimal tax may also yield a higher level of welfare than the case even without housing
bubbles. Finally, we calibrate the model to China. Our quantitative results show that
the optimal tax rate is about 23 percent, and social welfare is signicantly improved
with such a tax policy. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to investigate
the impact of government policies on reducing the negative e¤ects of housing bubbles
and improve social welfare in a model environment with Chinese characteristics.
It is also worth highlighting some directions in which our analysis can be extended.
For tractability, the model has focused only on the demand side of housing market, and
in particular, speculative motives. It however ignores the power of supply factors over
housing prices. Physical construction costs and the price of land may have signicant
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inuence on shaping housing prices (Glaeser 2013). According to Glaeser et al. (2017),
supply remains elastic in many Chinese cities, especially outside the rst tier cities.
Thus, a complete account for both demand and supply factors may improve our under-
standings of the great real estate boom in China. In addition, our paper considers only
a simple tax policy. For future research, however, it would be interesting to analyze
other types of government policies which are actively used in numerous countries, such
as regulation on speculation (Hirano and Yanagawa 2017), loan-to-value (LTV) policy
(Miao et al. 2015), home-purchase restriction (Du and Zhang 2015), and leverage and
collateral restriction (Zhao 2015; Ikeda and Phan 2016). These are all important issues
for our future research.
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Table 1
Sensitivity analysis with respect to  
F =E 
E optimal tax rate welfare gains
 
0.150 7:0040 6:0576 0:2092 0:5868
0.250 6:1800 4:7161 0:2142 0:6579
0.350 5:3560 3:5423 0:2192 0:7412
0.450 4:5320 2:5362 0:2241 0:8407
0.550 3:7080 1:6978 0:2289 0:9627
0.625 (the benchmark) 3:0900 1:1790 0:2325 1:0757
0.650 2:8840 1:0271 0:2337 1:1189
Source: authorscalculations
Table 2
Sensitivity analysis with respect to 
F =E 
E optimal tax rate welfare gains

7.00 2:6250 1:0016 0:2294 0:9746
8.00 3:0000 1:1447 0:2320 1:0573
8.24 (the benchmark) 3:0900 1:1790 0:2325 1:0757
9.00 3:3750 1:2878 0:2340 1:1310
10.00 3:7500 1:4309 0:2357 1:1974
11.00 4:1250 1:5739 0:2370 1:2579
12.00 4:5000 1:7170 0:2381 1:3134
Source: authorscalculations
1
1 Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Proposi-
tions
Proof of Lemma 1
For entrepreneurs born during the transition, the lifetime utility function is:
log(mt   sEt ) +  log EsEt
= log(mt   mt
1 +  1
) +  log(
mt
1 +  1
) +  log E
= log(
mt
1 + 
) +  log(
mt
1 +  1
) +  log E
= (1 + ) logmt +  log 
E   log(1 + )   log(1 +  1)
= (1 + ) log (1  )(kEt )(AtnEt )1  +  log E   log(1 + )   log(1 +  1)
= (1 + ) log (1  ) 1 [(1   )] 1  (R

)kEt +  log[(1  )(1   )]
1

1 
 R
  log(1 + )   log(1 +  1)
For entrepreneurs born in the post-transition stage, but before reaching the
steady state, the lifetime utility function is:
log(mt   sEt ) +  log Et+1sEt
= log(
 (1  )(kEt )(At)1 
(1 + )
) +  log
(1  )(1   )(kEt+1)(At+1)1 (1 + )
Et
= log(
 (1  )(kEt )(At)1 
(1 + )
) +  log
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)(1   )[ Et Et  kEt
(1  )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) ]
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1 (1 + )
Et
= log(
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)(kEt )(At)1 
(1 + 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+ log
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(1 + ) 1
1
For entrepreneurs born after reaching the steady state, the lifetime utility
function is (after being detrended):
log(m^   s^E) +  log Es^E
= log(
 Ek^E
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log
Ek^E(1 + )
E
= (1 + ) log Ek^E    log E + log(  
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
= (1 + ) log
(1   )
 
(1 +  1)
E
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1     log E
+ log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
= [
(1 + )
1     ] log 
E + (1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 (1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+ log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
Proof of Lemma 2
For workers born during the transition, the lifetime utility function is:
log(wt   swt + Tt) +  logRswt
= log(wt   swt + (kEt )(AtnEt )1 ) +  logRswt
= log(wt   w(wt + (kEt )(AtnEt )1 ) +  [(1  )(1   )]
1 
 (
R

)kEt )
+ logRw(wt + (k
E
t )
(Atn
E
t )
1 )
= log[
1
1 + 
(1  )At(
R
)

1  +
1
1 + 
 [(1  )(1   )] 1  (R

)kEt ]
+ log
R
1 +  1
[(1  )At(
R
)

1  +  [(1  )(1   )] 1  (R

)kEt ]
= (1 + ) log[(1  )At(
R
)

1  +  [(1  )(1   )] 1  (R

)kEt ]
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
For workers born in the post-transition stage, but before reaching the steady
state, the lifetime utility function is:
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log(wt   swt + Tt) +  logRswt
= log(wt   swt + (kEt )(At)1 ) +  logRswt
= log(
1
1 + 
wt +
1
1 + 
(kEt )
(At)
1 ) +  log
R
1 +  1
(wt + (k
E
t )
(At)
1 )
= log[
1
1 + 
At(1  )(1  )(1   )(kEt )(At)  +
1
1 + 
(kEt )
(At)
1 ]
+ log
R
1 +  1
[At(1  )(1  )(1   )(kEt )(At)  + (kEt )(At)1 ]
= log
1
1 + 
[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]At(kEt )(At) 
+ log
R
1 +  1
[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]At(kEt )(At) 
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]At(kEt )(At) 
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
For workers born after reaching the steady state, the lifetime utility function
is (after being detrended):
log(w^   s^w + T^ ) +  logRs^w
= log(w^   s^w + (k^E)1 ) +  logRs^w
= log(
1
1 + 
w^ +
1
1 + 
(k^E)1 ) +  log
R
1 +  1
(w^ + (k^E)1 )
= log
1
1 + 
[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ](k^E) 
+ log
R
1 +  1
[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ](k^E) 
= log
1
1 + 
[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][  
E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+ log
R
1 +  1
[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][  
E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][  
E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
Proof of Lemma 3
The housing bubble arises because high capital returns driven by resource
reallocation are not sustainable in the long run. Rational expectations of a
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strong future demand for alternative stores of value can thus induce currently
productive agents to speculate in the housing market. During both the tran-
sition and post-transition stages, the growth rate of housing prices equals the
rate of return of capital by no-arbitrage condition, i.e.
PHt+1
Pt
= Et+1: Specically,
during the transition stage, E is constant, E = [(1 )(1  )] 1 1  R; during
the post-transition stage, Et is a function of two state variables, k
E
t and At;
Et = (1  )(1  )(kEt ) 1(At)1 : In either case, the housing growth rate
is decreasing with a positive tax rate  :
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1, it is obvious that during both the transition and post-
transition stages, entrepreneurs welfare is monotonically decreasing with  :
From Lemma 2, for workers born during the transition, the lifetime utility func-
tion is:
log(wt   swt + Tt) +  logRswt
= (1 + ) log[(1  )At(
R
)

1  +  [(1  )(1   )] 1  (R

)kEt ]
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
By taking the rst-order condition with respect to  ; we nd that the optimal
tax rate is:
 = 
For workers born in the post-transition stage, but before reaching the steady
state, the lifetime utility function is:
log(wt   swt + Tt) +  logRswt
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]At(kEt )(At) 
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
Given the capital stock kE0 and technology level A0 when the economy ini-
tially enters the post-transition stage, the workers utility function can be rewrit-
ten as:
log(wt   swt + Tt) +  logRswt
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]
+(1 + )(
  T+1
1   ) log(1  ) +
~C
where ~C is a function of parameters. By taking the rst-order condition with
respect to  ; we nd that the optimal tax rate is:
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 =
(1  )  (1  T+1)(1  )(1   )
(1  T+1)  (1  T+1)(1  )(1   )
Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 2, for workers born after reaching the steady state, the lifetime
utility function is (after being detrended):
log(w^   s^w + T^ ) +  logRs^w
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][  
E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
By taking the rst-order condition with respect to  ; we nd the optimal
tax rate is:
 =
(1  )  (1  )(1   )
  (1  )(1   )
The social welfare is:
W = uw + uE
= [log(w^   s^w + T^ ) +  logRs^w] + [log(m^   s^E) +  log Es^E]
= (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][  
E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+(1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 (1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
+ [
(1 + )
1     ] log 
E
+ log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
By taking the rst-order condition with respect to  ; we nd the optimal
tax rate is:
 =
1
2(1  )  (1  )(1   )
  (1  )(1   )
Proof of Corollary 1
    =
1
2(1  )  (1  )(1   )
  (1  )(1   )  
(1  )  (1  )(1   )
  (1  )(1   )
=
  12(1  )
  (1  )(1   ) < 0
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Proof of Proposition 3
As  > 0; it is obvious that the tax policy improves workers welfare while
it reduces entrepreneurs welfare. Following the proof of Proposition 2, workers
welfare with an optimal tax rate  is:
uw1 = (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][
 E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
Workers welfare without the tax policy is:
uw2 = (1 + ) log[(1  )(1   )][
 E1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
Thus, given that  =
1
2(1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) ;
uw1   uw2 = (1 + )f

1   log(1  
) + log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]
  log(1  )(1   )g
= (1 + )f 
1   log
  12(1  )
  (1  )(1   ) + log
1
2
(1  )  log(1  )(1   )g
= (1 + ) log(
  12(1  )
  (1  )(1   ) )

1 
1
2
(1   )
Similarly, entrepreneurs welfare with an optimal tax rate  is:
uE1 = (1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 (1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+[
(1 + )
1     ] log 
E + log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
Entrepreneurs welfare without the tax policy is:
uE2 = (1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+[
(1 + )
1     ] log 
E + log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
Given that  =
1
2(1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) ;
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uE1   uE2 = (1 + )
1
1   log(1  
)
= (1 + ) log(
  12(1  )
  (1  )(1   ) )
1
1 
Proof of Proposition 4
Following the proof of Proposition 2, the social welfare with an optimal tax
rate  is:
W1 = (1 + ) log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ][  
E(1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+(1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 (1  )1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
+ [
(1 + )
1     ] log 
E
+ log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
The social welfare without the tax policy is:
W2 = (1 + ) log[(1  )(1   )][  
E1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+(1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
+ [
(1 + )
1     ] log 
E
+ log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
The social welfare without housing bubbles is (i.e. E = 1):
W3 = (1 + ) log[(1  )(1   )][  
1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]

1  
+(1 + ) log
(1   )(1 +  1)
 
(1 + z)(1 + )[
 1 
(1 +  1)(1 + z)(1 + )
]
1
1 
+ log
1
1 + 
+  log
R
1 +  1
+ log(
 
(1 + )(1   ) ) +  log(1 + )
Thus, given that  =
1
2(1 ) (1 )(1  )
 (1 )(1  ) ;
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W1  W2 = (1 + )f1 + 
1   log(1  
) + log[(1  )(1  )(1   ) + ]
  log(1  )(1   )g
= (1 + )f1 + 
1   log
  12(1  )
  (1  )(1   ) + log
1
2
(1  )  log(1  )(1   )g
= (1 + ) log(
  12(1  )
  (1  )(1   ) )
1+
1 
1
2
(1   )
If (  
1
2(1 )
 (1 )(1  ) )
1+
1 
1
2
(1  ) > 1; then W1 > W2:
W2  W3 = [(1 + )
1     ] log 
E +
(1 + )
1   log 
E
= [
2(1 + )
1     ] log 
E = (1 + )[
2
1    

1 + 
] log E
Thus,
W1  W3 = (W1  W2) + (W2  W3)
= (1 + ) log(
  12(1  )
  (1  )(1   ) )
1+
1 
1
2
(1   ) (
E)
2
1   1+
If (  
1
2(1 )
 (1 )(1  ) )
1+
1 
1
2
(1  ) (
E)
2
1   1+ > 1; then W1 > W3:
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